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PARTI
The Post- War Stabilization ProblemC,CHAPTER 9
Recognition, Measurement, and Formulation
of the Stabilization Problem, 1918—1920
Although traditional concepts of normal techniques, reserve
ratios, and exchange rates, and an abstract conception of gold
as standard helped to obscure the true breakdown of the in-
ternai:ional gold standard, it was clearly apparent in 1919 that
the war had left a series of foreign exchange difficulties as a
legacy to belligerents and neutrals alike. Not until two years
after the Armistice, however, was any sort of consensus ar-
rived at as to the general nature of what may be called the
post-war stabilization problem. The main objectives of British
foreign exchange policy were nevertheless fixed and immu-
table from the beginning.
Recognition and Measurement of the Problem
by Great Britain
The Cunliffe Committee had given classical expression to the
dominant British view on these matters even before the war
ended. Its Report dealt with means, not ends, and made rec-
ommendations and outlined a course of action that took for
granted the continuity of British financial policy. It reflected,
but did not justify, explain, or defend the fundamental mone-
tary decisions of Great Britain—not to change the gold con-
tent of the sovereign and to eliminate as soon as possible any
deviations from parity with gold that might appear in the ex-
changes. These decisions were not the result of shrewd calcu-
latio:ri of the balance of advantage to be derived from a low
rate of stabilization or a return to par. Such considerations
formed part of many later discussions, but they were not final
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determinants of British currency policy. The overriding na-
tional advantages of a return to par by sterling, the currency
of the world's merchant and the world's banker, was assumed
rather than calculated. The will to maintain parity, or if
forced to deviate from it, to return to it, was the outgrowth
of banking tradition rather than of political expediency or of
economic analysis. It may be thought of as the practical ap-
plication on a grand scale of a deeply ingrained code of bank-
ing ethics. In this sense, it may be said that it was based funda-
mentally on moral considerations, combined with faith in the
mechanisms of the pre-war gold standard system based upon
long experience. The British paper pound was a promise to
pay a certain weight of gold, and this promise had to be re-
deemed. It was felt that the restoration of the conditions
under which it could be redeemed necessarily implied the
re-creation of the essentials of the smoothly operating gold
standard system of pre-war days.
The Cunliffe Committee charted a familiar, orthodox, and
deflationary course, which it regarded as the only one that
could achieve these fundamental aims and prevent continual
strain on sterling, the dissipation of the Bank of England's
gold reserve, and the impairment of Great Britain's competi-
tive position in trade. Such a Spartan policy, however, was
impossible immediately after the war, and the practical
British policy was to follow the recommendations of the Com-
mittee, not all at once, but gradually and persistently. The
Committee had grossly underestimated the seriousness of the
foreign exchange problem, and the first practical step was to
measure it without self-deception or illusion. This was by no
means easy, because of the generally artificial nature of the
world's foreign exchange rate structure. While the currencies
of Russia and the defeated Central Powers had lost most of
their value in foreign markets, the exchanges of the other
great economic powers of Europe, Asia, and North and South
America still showed the familiar outlines of the pre-war
system of mint pars. The average daily exchange quotationsTHE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 179
onNew York in thirteen important widely separated markets
show how moderate were the deviations from this system in
February 1919. The range from a deviation of io per cent
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above to 20 per cent below, or, if Italy and Brazil are omitted,
from io per cent above to 5 per cent below dollar parity was
not an accurate reflection of the relative values of these cur-
rencies. The position off sterling near the middle of this group
was the result of a vast pegging operation. The grouping of
rates as a whole was artificial and lacked all the essential ele-
ments of stability, particularly since the international busi-
ness cycle, following the long and continuous expansion that
had culminated in the last months of the war, had already
entered a phase of recession and contraction.2
Establishment of a Measure of Sterling Depreciation
The first task of Great Britain, therefore, was to find out the
facts. This involved three important steps:(i)to free the
sterling-dollar exchange rate from artificial control;(2)to
Commission of Cold and Silver Inquiry(U. S. Senate, Serial 8, 1924), pp.
10-1.
:2 Wesley C. Mitchell distinguishes the phases of the four international busi-
ness cycles beginning in 1913 as follows (international Pattern of Business
Cycles, 22d Sess., International Institute of Statistics, The Hague, 1934)
1913—14 to 1918: Recession, 1913—14; cOntraction, 1914—15; revival, 1915; CC-
pansion, 1915—18; recession, igi8.
gtS to 192o:Recession, 1918; brief and mild contraction, igig; rapid re-
vival after spring of 1919; expansion in rest of 1919 and early 1920; recession,
1920.
L920 to Recession, severe contraction, 1921—22; revival, 1922—
23; minor oscillations around a rising level 1924—28; recession, 1929.
1929— Recession, severe contraction in 1930—32 or reviva'
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reestablish in London a market for gold in which a price
could be determined by the play of international demand;
toeliminate the control of domestic prices by govern-
ment so that the internal purchasing power of the pound
might once more reflect ordinary economic forces. Only when
these three steps had been taken could a 'premium' on gold
be established in London which could serve in a significant
way as a measure of depreciation in the sense set forth in the
Cunliffe Report.
FREEING THE STERLING-DOLLAR EXCHANGE
On March 21, 1919governmentcontrol over the sterling-
dollar exchange was officially withdrawn.4 This did not mean,
however, that all restrictions on the market were eliminated
or that government intervention in the play.of supply and de-
mand forces had ended. Until August 1919 the following im-
portant classes of transactions which would have involved the
purchase of foreign currencies with sterling were still pro-
hibited by Treasury Order:
;)remittances from the United Kingdom by way of loan or for
the purchase of securities or property other than merchandise,
or for the purchase of foreign currency as an investment, or to
be held with a view to appreciation in value
2)the importation of bonds, scrip or other documents of title
thepurchase of securities which had at any time been in
physical possession outside the United Kingdom.
In addition to this drastic limitation on private international
financial as distinct from merchandise transactions, the sale
of 90 day British treasury bills in New York was continued.
For the various senses in which this term is employed, cf. Ch.ThePrice
of Gold.
Cf. W. A. Brown, Jr., England and the New Gold Standard, p. 46. This action
had been foreshadowed by (i)the fact that the last substantial credit granted
to Great Britain by the U. S. Treasury before that date had not been used as
a means of supporting the exchanges; (2)thebeginning of the dismantling of
the machinery of the American Dollar Securities Committee.THE STABILIZATION PROBLEM i8i
These had been offered in regular weekly installments of $15
million since August 22, 1917,andthe amount outstanding
did not reach its peak of $98 million until September 30,
:L919. Furthermore the British government was still in posses-
sion of a substantial amount of dollars from previous credits,
and obtained new credits of $200 million in April and May
The proceeds of these credits were in large measure
used by the British government to purchase foodstuffs for
import into the United Kingdom under the almost dicta-
tonal powers conferred upon the Food Controller in 1916.
rrhe Board of Trade, moreover, continued to restrict certain
classes of imports under a transitional policy described in the
House of Commons on March io,1919 by Sir Aukiand
Geddes, Minister of Reconstruction. The policy of the gov-
ernment was to admit freely raw materials and semi-manu-
factured articles not produced by British industries brought
into being by the war, but, until a date provisionally set as
September i, 1919, to restrict the import of manufactured
goods not essential for British consumption, or of a kind pro-
cluced by industries the government desired especially to
shield. At the same time restrictions on exports were greatly
relaxed and special efforts were made to encourage the entre-
pot trade. Sir Aukland was explicit in his statement that one
of the considerations by which the government was to be
guided. in carrying out this policy was the possible effect upon
the American exchange of expected heavy imports of raw
materials.
Once freed of restrictions, British exports began to increase
rapidly in response to active civilian demand, especially on
the continent. British short term credit was liberally extended
to finance this export movement, and the generally active
trade which began after the spring of 1919.Thenumber of
bills drawn on London increased sharply, as is indicated by
the rise in the portfolio of commercial bills held by the
London clearing banks in 1919 and 1920 (Chart 7) and by182 RESTORATION
the increase in their holdings of acceptances as shown in the
accompanying monthly figures (thousands of pounds) from














Because it was connected with a movement of goods favor-
able to sterling, the expansion of short term foreign lending
was not in conflict with the general policy of postponing and
moderating some of the forces that threatened to weaken the
exchange position. This general policy did not allow, how-
ever, a similar growth in the flotation of new foreign loans in
London. Treasury control over new issues was relaxed slowly.
During the last quarter of 1918 a considerable number of
new foreign loans had been permitted, but during the first
six months of 1919 no foreign government, and only one
colonial loan, was placed in London. Some capital was ob-
tained for rubber and mining enterprises through the issue of
new shares, but the market was really closed to foreign bor-
rowers. Even after the general relaxation of control over
private international financial transactions in August 1919,
foreign capital issues continued to be subject to Treasury
license. In November 1919 this restriction was removed, and
foreign lending expanded somewhat (Table io), though
strong semi-official sanctions restricting new foreign capital
issues in London continued to be present in the background
(cf. Ch. ii). Their moderate amount during the three years
immediately following the war was by no means accidental,
and the British government itself began to contract its ad-THE STABILIZATION PROBLEM
vances to its former allies. During the fiscal year 1919—20,
which corresponds quite closely to the period of the post-war
boom, such advances totaled £i63 million as contrasted with
[236 million in and £5°5 million in The
Treasury, moreover, was in 1919alreadyin receipt of large
repayments from the Dominions.
TABLE JO
New Capital Applications in London
Foreign, Colonial and Dominion, July 1919—June 1920
FOREIGN COLONIAL AND DOMINION TOTAL
Govern- Corpora- Govern- Corpora-
ment tion ment tion
(thousands of pounds)
1919
July 4,821 1,470 6,291
August 127 127
September 2,511 990 3,501
October 1,803 386 6,500 120 8,8og
November 4,147 6,200 1,083 11,430
December 17,702 2,000 6,232 25,934
1920
January 5,500 2,041 8,122
February 1,944 2,000 2,733 6,677
March 1,240 2,578 3,818
April 242 1,258 1,500
May 350 1,310 z,66o
June 2,500 4,683 7,183
Compiled, by Harry Angney from published prospectuses in The Times, Statist,
and Economist. With the exception of December igrg, these totals correspond
reasonably well with the figures given by the Midland Bank (ef. Ap. Table 4).
In all compilations of this sort many judgments have to be made concerning
the inclusion or exclusion of individual items and the amounts and dates of the
included items. In this compilation Mr. Angney followed the principles laid
dcwn by the writer in the study of pit-war British capital exports prepared for
the pit-war part of these studies with the help of competent authorities in
London.
The firststepin the establishment of a measure of sterling
depreciation—the freeing of the sterling-dollar exchange—
was not fully completed until late in 1919 or even early in
1920. Special defenses provided by the government continued
to offer, though in diminishing degree, some resistance to the
Kirkaldy, op. cit., p. igg, Table i.184 RESTORATION
decline of the pound in New York, but they were over-
whelmed by a long pent-up demand for dollars which carried
the sterling-dollar rate to 3.18inFebruary 1920.°
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR GOLD IN
LONDON
The decline of sterling against the dollar in 1919 was not at
once reflected in the appearance of a 'premium' on gold in
London. As the Cunliffe Committee had pointed out, the
link connecting the sovereign and the paper currency of
Great Britain to gold bullion had long been broken. In
March 1919 when the sterling-dollar rate was freed from con-
trol, the export of gold was for the first time legally pro-
hibited. It was therefore still impossible to measure the ap-
preciation or depreciation of any currency in terms of a world
price of gold. The price of gold was nowhere determined by
world-wide forces. The gold of the European continent was
completely shut out of the world's trade by export embargoes.
There was an embargo upon the export of gold from Aus-
tralia. All the gold exported from the Union of South Africa
had still to be sold to the Bank of England at its statutory
price. Gold could not be exported from the United States
except under government license. All the avenues off approach
by which gold from abroad could reach the public in India
were effectually closed. The possessors of gold in the United
States, South Africa, India, or in England, Spain, or France,
could not offer their gold to prospective buyers in competi-
tion with one another. The purchasers of gold in these coun-
tries did not have 'access to the world's supplies, but on the
other hand, they were not exposed to foreign competition
for the supplies in their own countries, or in the sphere of
influence of their own countries.
In order, therefore, to provide a measure of sterling de-
preciation in the form of a 'premium' on gold, it was neces-
OFora detailed account of the factors in this decline see Brown, op. cit.,
pp. 55ff.THE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 185
sary to reestablish a genuine international market for gold.
To do so, and at the same time to prevent the reserves of the
Bank cf England from being drawn away, new arrangements
were put into effect in September 1919governingthe distri-
bution of gold through London. These arrangements in-
cluded (i) the granting of a license for the export of newly
produced South African gold from London; (2) a change of
policy i.ñ India that permitted Indian demand to become once
more effective in the London market.
The Gold and Silver (Export Control) Act of 1920. The
new arrangements governing the export of South African
gold from London were put into effect by administrative
action, and were later sanctioned by the Gold and Silver
(Export Control) Act of 1920 (io and ii Geo. V Ch. 70).
This Act expired by limitation on December 31, 1925, a
circumstance that greatly influenced the date of the British
return to gold. Its essential provisions were:
"Section eight of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1879
(which enables the exportation of certain articles to be pro-
hibited:), shall have effect as if, in addition to the articles therein
mentioned, there were included the following articles, that is to
say, gold or silver coin and gold or silver bullion.
•.I
Goldproduced in any part of his Majesty's Dominions and im-
ported into the United Kingdom under any arrangement ap-
proved by the Treasury may, notwithstanding anything in this
section, be exported in accordance with the terms of the arrange-
ment.
•.
Itshall not be lawful for any person, except under, and in pursu-
ance of a license granted by the Treasury, to melt down, break
up, or use otherwise than as currency any gold or silver coin
which i.s for the time being current in the United Kingdom or
in any British possession or foreign country."
Under the terms of this Act, South African gold could once
more be sold in London to the highest bidder. The differencei86 RESTORATION
between the price at which this gold was sold in London for
export and the statutory buying price at the Bank of England
constituted a 'premium' on gold and a measure of sterling
depreciation in gold. For five years this 'premium' was basi-
cally determined by the fluctuations in the sterling-dollar ex-
change. It was therefore in actual fact a measure of sterling
depreciation in terms of dollars.
The Change of Policy in India. From June 29, 1917 to
June 21, 1920 the British government carried out a policy of
controlling the import of gold into India. All gold imported
into India had to be sold to the government at a fixed price
known as the 'acquisition price.' The principles upon which
this price was fixed, however, were not constant, and the
history of the 'acquisition price' is divided into three distinct
phases.
The first phase lasted from June 1917 to September 1919
and was really part of the British war-time gold concentra-
Lion policy. It rested upon the legal theory that throughout
the war the gold standard was maintained in Great Britain
and that gold and sterling were identical. The Indian govern-
ment purchased gold at a price in rupees which was based
upon the sterling-rupee rate of exchange and the Bank of
England's statutory buying price for gold. Whenever the
sterling-rupee rate moved, the price of gold in rupees that the
Indian government paid was readjusted so as to produce a bid
in the London market of 77 S. 9 d. per standard ounce. India
was not allowed to outbid the Bank of England for gold.
Toward the end of the war and during the post-war months
the sterling-rupee rate moved against England and the cor-
responding change in the rupee price of gold offered by the
Indian government was regularly made. As a result, during
the months immediately following the freeing of the sterling-
dollar exchange, when the pound was falling rapidly in terms
of the dollar, Indian demand for gold became wholly in-
effective in the London market. In particular, when the
American embargo on gold exports was lifted in June 1919,THE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 187
gold could not move from America to India because the price
off ereci by India was not a competitive price. Meanwhile, the
greatly reduced imports of gold into India resulting from the
war-time restrictions and the failure after the war to allow
India to replenish her supplies was producing a high price of
gold within India. If this price is contrasted with the series
of low prices of gold existing within the various belligerent
countries as a result of their failure to permit exports, while
maintaining the pre-war legal definitions of the gold content
of their standard coins, and the obligation of their central
banks to buy all gold offered at their pre-war buying prices,
a clear view of the disappearance of the world price of gold
obtained.
When a free gold market in London was established in
September 1919thepolicy of India was changed. The fact
that sterling and gold were not identical was recognized for
the first time in practice by the Indian government, and on
September 15,1919 Indiabegan to bid for gold in London at
the world price. As sterling depreciated in dollars and the
price of gold in London rose, the Indian government fixed a
price for gold in rupees which, when converted into pounds
sterling, would make possible a bid for gold that was competi-
tive with the price established in that market on the basis of
the dollar-sterling exchange. The price of gold in India be-
came a function of both the changing sterling-rupee rate and
the changing sterling-dollar rate. All gold imported into
India still had to be sold to the government at its buying
price, which remained lower than the market price within
Endia itself, but the new policy was flexible and allowed
Indian demand once more to be felt, although not in its full
force.
In February 1920thisphase of the Indian gold import
control policy was superseded by a policy forced upon Great
Britain and India by a rise in the price of silver that threat-
ened to reach the point at which the silver content of the
rupee was worth more as bullion than as coin. As a conse-i88 RESTORATION
quence of this rise in the price of silver, the sterling-rupee
rate was forced rapidly upward until it reached two shillings
in February 1920. The new policy was to fix the price at
which the government would buy gold, to stabilize the rupee
in terms of the dollar, and to move the rate of exchange on
London so that an unvarying bid for gold in rupees would
always yield a bid in the London market competitive with
the bid based on the dollar parity price. This scheme was a
failure. The price of silver fell rapidly almost from the day it
was put into effect. The rupee was very weak in London, and
the Indian bid for gold in London once more ceased to be
competitive. Consumer demand in India for gold as an instru-
ment for saving was once more deprived of power to make
itself felt in the world market, and a domestic price of gold
in India far in excess of the world price resulted.
Finally, in June 1920, all attempts to control the sterling-
rupee exchange and the import of gold into India were aban-
doned. Free access to the world market, in combination with
government sales of gold, brought the internal price of gold
in India into line with the world price. India was once more
able to obtain such gold as she wished to pay for by very
slightly outbidding America in the London market.
The second step in providing a criterion of sterling depre-
ciation—the establishment of an international market for
gold in London in which a price for newly produced gold
could be determined by the play of international consumer
and monetary demand—was finally completed by the aban-
donment of the 'acquisition price' in India. Like the first
step—the freeing of the sterling-dollar exchange—it required
about a year for its completion.
DECONTROL OF PRICES IN ENGLAND
In order to make the 'premium' on gold in London a true
measure of sterling depreciation in terms of dollars, it was
necessary also to end the extraordinary domination of the
government over British domestic prices. Until that was ac-THE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 189
complished, the relationship of the exchange rate to the rela-
tive price levels in America and Great Britain might be as
close as could be desired and still the 'premium' on gold
based upon that rate might be a poor measure of the sterling
depreciation under conditions of a free domestic economy in
Great Britain. At the time the sterling-dollar exchange rate
was freed from control, prices were higher in relation to their
pre-war level in Great Britain than in the United States. At
the rate at which it had been pegged the pound was obviously
and measurably overvalued. In addition, the general price
level was very much lower than it would have been had gov-
:ernment control of prices been less all-pervading. In 1919the
British Food Minister stated that 85 per cent of the total
food supplies of the country were bought and sold by the
government and that 94 per cent of all commodity prices
were controlled.
This was the result of the extension of government control
from one commodity to another during the war, forced by the
interdependence of prices and by the fact that purchasing
power denied expression in one direction sought outlets in
other directions. The influence of this government control
'was indicated, in general, by the decline in the rate of in-
crease in British prices during the latter part of 1917and
igi8. .A rapid increase in prices, which began in the spring of
1919aftera brief reaction, was in part the expression of the
one after another of various governmental controls,
together with the release of purchasing power by the declin-
i:ng demands of government upon available savings and bank
credit. So rapid was the increase in prices accompanying the
removal of governmental controls that some were, for a time,
restored in the latter part of 1919andin 1920asa result of
public complaint about the rising cost of living.7 In the main,
however, decontrol of prices in England followed quickly
after decontrol of the exchanges and the third condition for
Cf. Harris, op. cit., pp.72, 77,82. Professor Harris gives a full account of the
price control features of British war finance, pp.62 if.190 RESTORATION
ascertaining the true depreciation of sterling was met during
the early stages of the restocking boom.
The British Attempt to Return to Normal Techniques
of Credit Control
The problem of ascertaining how much sterling was 'depre-
ciated,' though on the surface rather simple, required about
two years for its solution. During that time Great Britain was
attempting to restore the machinery that the Cunliffe Com-
mittee had called "the only effective remedy for an adverse
balance of trade and an undue growth of credit." This also
was by no means easy, for the authorities were faced both by
a conflict of objectives and by changes in technical money
market procedures.
The Conflict of Objectives
From 1919 to 1920 the British authorities were trying simul-
taneously to achieve three objectives: a return to normal
trade relations; a return to normal methods of monetary ad-
ministration as urged by the Cunliffe Committee; and the
preservation of the public credit. The restocking and ex-
port booms of 19 19—20 were clearly welcome from the point
of view of the firstobjective, for they put demobilized
soldiers to work in civil occupations and greatly facilitated
the always difficult transition from war-time to peace-time
production. The encouragement of export credits, as already
noted, fitted in well with this objective, but conflicted with a
policy of preventing inflation in order to promote the second
and third objectives. Restocking booms cannot proceed far
without leading to increases in prices and credit expansion,
particularly in the form of advances to bank customers. But
these were developments directly at variance with the defla-
tionary emphasis of the Cunliffe report and the determina-
tion to return as soon as possible to parity with gold. Conse-
quently the authorities took steps to restrict the growth of de-
posits and of currency in circulation, but in this they wereTHE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 19!
restrainedby the necessity of avoiding the creation of condi-
tions in the money market that would be adverse to the re-
funding and management of the public debt. The Bank of
England and the government, therefore, were under severe
handicaps in endeavoring to return to the techniques ap-
propriate before the war to periods when sterling was weak.
The joint stock and other banks, on the other hand, were
under a strong inducement arising from their ordinary rela-
tions to their customers in a time of active business and rising
prices to increase their 'advances' even though at the same
time they were under pressure to contract other items in their
portfolio and were quite willing to do so in order to promote
the achievement of the second and third objectives of general
policy.
Ouit of such a conflict of objectives the general result
emerged that the Bank of England and the government were
in their basic policy attempting to oppose rapid credit ex-
and the T?anks were in their general policy attempt-
ing to promote it, but that there was some vacillation on both
sides.
1Vew Relations in the Market
In SU(;h a situation of underlying conflict of aim requiring a
series of compromises the appearance of certain new relations
in the money market was of great importance. These may be
described under four major headings: the Currency Note,
gold held outside the Bank of England, the rise of the treasury
bill, and the fluidity of the ratio system of the joint stock
banks.
THE CURRENCY NOTE
The Cunliffe Committee recommended that additional issues
of Currency Notes above a fiduciary limit should be covered
by Ba:rik of England Notes withdrawn from the reserve of the
Bank, and that when Currency Notes were reduced to an
amount consistent with the maintenance of a reserve of £150192 RESTORATION
million, they should be retired and Bank of England Notes
substituted. The Committee called attention to proposals to
reduce the Currency Note issue byper cent per annum.
Though it did not specify this figure, it did recommend that,
except in emergencies, the limit of the fiduciary issue of the
Currency Note during any year should be the maximum
amount of the fiduciary, issue during the preceding year.
Prior to December 15,1919 demandsfrom the public for
new currency could be met by the issue of either Currency
Notes or Bank of England Notes at the will of the govern-
ment and the Bank, but on that date the recommendations
of the Committee were put into effect by a famous Treasury
Minute, which fixed the fiduciary maximum at the maximum
actually outstanding during the preceding year. This did not
mean, however, that the Bank of England Note issue and the
Currency Note issue would vary exactly together. Room was
still left I!or considerable elasticity in practice provided the
maximum was not exceeded. Furthermore the amount of
Bank of England Notes held in the Currency Note Reserve
Account could be increased at the will of the Treasury,
which could therefore directly influence the Bank of England
proportion.
These two circumstances meant that the effects of changes
in hand-to-hand circulation upon banking reserves could still
be modified to suit the aims of credit policy through the
technical administration of the dual system of note issue.
TREASURY BILLS
Atthe end of. the war treasury bills constituted a large part
of the secondary reserves of the joint stock banks. Therefore,
by altering the composition of their secondary reserves they
could replenish their primary reserves without contracting
their total advances to the discount market or their total in-
vestment in bills. By allowing treasury bills to mature without
replacing them by others they could convert part of their
portfolio into Bank of England balances and make room forSTABILIZATION PROBLEM 193
additional investments in commercial bills and additional
short term loans. They could increase their short term lend-
ing to private borrowers without affecting their customary
iratios.
The possession of this means of directly replenishing their
primary reserves did not, of course, deprive the joint stock
banks of their ability to replenish their reserves indirectly in
the traditional English manner by reducing their total ac-
commodation to the market. When they did so, the discount
houses had to seek accommodation from the Bank pending a
reduction in their own portfolios. Whether this accommoda-
tion was obtained by the discount with, or sale to, the Bank
of commercial bills or treasury bills was a matter of indiffer-
ence to the discount houses as long as such accommodation
hadtobe obtained. But the presence in their portfolios of a
large volume of treasury bills gave them a new means, if not
of avoiding, at least of shortening their visits to the Bank.
When the discount houses, faced by a reduction in the total
investment of the joint stock banks in bills and in their ac-
commodation to the market as a whole, are obliged to reduce
their portfolio of commercial bills, they collect more matur-
ing bills than they buy new bills. This builds up their bal-
ances at the Bank of England enabling them to pay off their
debt at the Bank, and at the same time reduces 'bankers
balances' at the Bank and commercial bank deposits. The
three steps of the operation—the original withdrawal of
credit from the discount market by the banks, the visit of the
market to the Bank of England, and the net repayment of
of the outstanding commercial bills which takes the
market out of the Bank—leave the joint stock banks with
smaller deposits and secondary reserves, but with primary re-
serves unchanged, and leave the market with less portfolio
and less debt. If, on the other hand, the portfolio of the dis-
count houses is reduced by letting treasury bills run off, their
balances at the Bank of England are more quickly replenished
than if they had to carry through an adjustment in their port-194 RESTORATION
folio of commercial bills, and the reserves and deposits of the
joint stock banks are not reduced by the collection of checks
drawn by debtors under maturing acceptance credits. When
the portfolio of the market is in commercial bills the replen-
ishment of joint stock bank reserves at the Bank of England
in the traditional way gives a temporary relief pending either
a contraction in the credit superstructure or some increase in
reserves from other sources. When the portfolio of the market
is in treasury bills the process gives rise to an addition to re-
serves since maturing treasury bills, unlike maturing com-
mercial bills, are paid off in Bank of England funds, unless
the Treasury is forced th borrow to replace the treasury bills
redeemed, in which event there is no change either in bank
deposits or in reserves (cf. Ch. ig, Influence of the Rise of the
Treasury Bill on the Technique of making Bank Rate effec-
tive)
The exercise of these supplementary powers of replenish-
ing reserves was limited by the steps the government and the
Bank were able to take in retaliation. The joint stock banks
could not use their new powers without creating difficulties
for the government in the management of the public debt.
If the government was in receipt of sufficient current reve-
nue it was in a position to bring pressure on the banks by
reducing its indebtedness to the Bank of England, that is,
by reducing Bank of England 'ways and means advances' in-
stead of retiring other outstanding debt, or simply accumulat-
ing balances at the Bank. If, on the other hand, current pay-
ments were heavy in relation to current revenue, the failure
of the banks and the market to renew treasury bills might
force the government to increase its borrowings from the
Bank of England. Such a situation would strongly incline
the government to raise the rate on treasury bills. As long as
the treasury bill rate was dominant in the market, this was
very likely to force an increase in Bank rate. In any case, the
Bank of England, if it found that its control over the market
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might. feel obliged to take other measures to make its credit
policy effective.
GOLD HELD OUTSIDE THE BANK OF ENGLAND
Gold holdings were not completely centralized at the Bank of
England after the war, and consequently:
1)Goldheld by the joint stock banks was potentially a means
for increasing their balances at the Bank of England and thereby
promoting an easier money market situation and influencing
Bank rate policy.
2) Gold held by the government could be used to relieve pres-
sure on Bank of England reserves by being drawn on to meet
special export demands or being deposited at the Bank. On the
other hand, the government, by simply withholding this gold at
a time when the Bank was not a competitive bidder in the bullion
market, could allow all other sources of pressure on the Bank's
reserve to have full play.
FLUIDI:TY OF THE RATIO SYSTEM OF THE JOINT STOCK BANKS
For twenty years before the war the ratio between the sum of
and at the Bank of England,' 'money at call and short
notice,' 'discounts,' 'advances,' and 'investments' to 'total de-
posits' was on the average of i io.6 per cent. It had tended to
decline slightly, being 1 11.5 per cent for the decade 1894—
1903 and 109.8 per cent for the decade immediately preceding
the war. On July i, 1913 it was 109.2 per cent. During 1919
and 1920, and indeed throughout the post-war period, it
fluctuated between 102 and 104 per cent. This reduction was
caused by the more rapid growth of deposits than capital
funds during the war. Such a change always affects the ratio
system. It makes it inevitable that the sum of the items enu-
merated should be a smaller proportion of total deposits, and
probable that they should be a larger proportion
of total liabilities.8 It is clear, as a matter of simple arithmetic,
point is supported by the following considerations:
:1)Ifthe sum of the enumerated assets was brought into the same relation-
to i:otal deposits as before the war, it would have to bear a higher ratio to196 RESTORATION
that if the sum of these items was a smaller proportion of
'total deposits,' it was impossible to restore all the items indi-
vidually to their pre-war ratios to 'total deposits.' In particu-
lar, if the joint stock banks felt that good banking practice
required them to restore their 'investments,' 'discounts,' and
'advances,' or the sum of these three, to their pre-war rela-
tionship to 'total deposits,' they could do so only at the cost
total liabilities as long as deposits were relatively greater than capital funds
as compared to pre-war. This, however, could be accomplished only at the
cost of a decline in the ratio between the other assets of the banks, such as
buildings and equipment, to capital funds. The greater the increase in total
deposits relative to capital funds the greater would be the dedine in this ratio.
Butthisratio could not be reduced below a certain point and when this point
was reached an absolute bar to the maintenance of the pre-war ratio between
the sum of the enumerated assets and total deposits existed.
2) If the sum of the enumerated assets was brought into the same relationship
to total liabilities as before the war, it would have to bear a smaller ratio to
total deposits as long as deposits were relatively greater than capital as com-
pared to pre-war. This, however, could be accomplished only at the cost of an
increase in the ratio between the other assets of the banks and capital funds.
The greater the increase in total deposits relative to capital funds the greater,
on this assumption, would be the increase in this ratio. But a rapid increase
in the ratio between the other assets to capital funds was inherently im-
probable, and beyond a certain point practically impossible. Therefore it was
inherently probable that the ratio of the enumerated assets to total liabilities
would not be restored to that existing before the war as long as total deposits
were much larger relatively to capital funds as compared to pre-war.
If the ratio of the other assets to capital funds was restored to that pre-
vailing before the war, the ratio of the sum of the enumerated assets to total
deposits would have to be smaller, and their ratio to total liabilities larger,
as long as total deposits continued to be larger relatively to capital funds as
compared to pre-war.
These three considerations all point to the conclusion that a more rapid
growth of deposits than capital funds set up a strong tendency toward a de-
crease in the ratio of the sum of 'cash and at the Bank of England,' 'money at
call and short notice,' 'discounts,' 'loans and advances,' and 'investments' to
'total deposits' and an increase in the ratio of the sum of these items to 'total
liabilities.' Consideration i shows that the change could not be completely ab-
sorbed by an increase in the ratio of the sum of the enumerated assets to total
liabilities; consideration 2 shows that it was very improbable that it should be
completely absorbed by a decrease in the ratio of the sum to total deposits;
consideration 3 shows that it was inherently probable that the change should
be shared by the two ratios.THE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 197
of a reduction in the pre-war ratios of their primary or secon-
dary reserves to 'total deposits,' and, per contra, if they felt
that sound banking practice required them to preserve the
pre-war ratios of 'cash and at the Bank of England' and
money at call and short notice' to 'total deposits,' they could
do so only at the cost of a reduction in the ratios of their
discounts,' 'loans,' and 'investments' to 'total deposits.' It
was therefore certain that the question of which, if any, of
these pre-war ratios the joint stock banks would think it wise
or necessary to restore would become of importance in the
credit administration of the Bank of England.
At the beginning of 1919theratios of 'cash and at the
Bank of England' and 'money at call and short notice' to
'total deposits,' were both lower than the customary pre-war
figures. The ratios of 'discounts' and of 'investments' to 'total
deposits' were both considerably higher, and the ratio of 'ad-
vances' to 'total deposits' was much lower than pre-war. The
joint stock banks were therefore in a position to bring their
ratio system much more closely into line with pre-war prac-
tice, though not to restore the pre-war ratio system corn-
plete]y, by largely increasing their 'advances' and reducing
their 'discounts' and 'investments.' The circumstances of the
time, however, were the reverse of favorable for a reduction
in either. If the joint stock banks were willing to reduce still
further the ratios of their primary and secondary reserves
to 'total deposits,' they were in a position to return to the
pre-war ratios of their other principal assets to 'total deposits'
by a more rapid increase in 'advances' than in 'discounts' and
'investments,' with an accompanying expansion of deposits.
Such a course was technically justified by the completion of
the great banking amalgamation movement which brought
with it better clearing and reduced the need of cash reserves.
The whole position of the ratio system of the joint stock
banks was still in flux, but the changes in it that were most
riatu:cal and from a technical point of view most defensible,
and most in accord with the needs of their customers, were198 RESTORATION
those best calculated to resist deflationary policies on the part
of the Bank of England.
Credit Control, 1919—1920
While the foreign exchange problem was being defined and
measured, both the government and the joint stock banks
were possessed of unusually strong weapons of attack and de-
fense which they could use to shape conditions in the money
market in accordance with their desires. There was a definite
conflict of objective and motive between the government and
the banks, and on questions of high policy some of the aims
recognized by both as desirable were mutually exclusive.
Therefore, it was necessary, before there could be a return
to normal techniques, to have agreement between the govern-
ment and the Bank on credit policy, and devise some means
for making that policy effective. Concentration of all the gold
in the country in the hands of the Bank of England or the
government, the reestablishment of a customary and binding
practice with respect to joint stock bank ratios, and the treat-
ment of treasury bills in the portfolios of the joint stock
banks so as not to interfere with the management of the pub-
lic debt or counteract Bank of England policy were means
tending toward this end. It is clear that the assent and co-
operation of the joint stock banks were becoming more than
ever essential to the success of any credit control policy. The
pre-war method of control indirectly through the short term
market had to be supplemented by a larger measure of direct
agreement between the great commercial banks, the govern-
ment, and the Bank of England. It is in the light of this new
situation that we shall briefly review the attempt to return to
normal techniques in igig and 1920.
The most striking features of British banking statistics dur-
ing the boom which began early in 1919 and continued to
April 1920 were a rapid increase in deposits and in notes in
circulation and a decline in bank reserves (Chart 19 A and
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duringthe entire boom while 'bills discounted' declined.
During the last half of i 919 'money at call and short notice'
fell rapidly and in the first quarter of 1920 'cash and at the
:Bank of England' also fell. The net effect of these changes was
a rapid growth in deposits throughout 1919, followed by a
temporary leveling off. They also produced changes in the
ratio system of the clearing banks in harmony with the analy-
sis just given. The ratios of 'discounts,' 'advances,' and 'in-
vestments' to 'total deposits' approached much more closely
their customary pre-war magnitudes, whereas the ratios of
primary and secondary reserves fell very substantially below
pre-war (Chart 19Band Ap. Table 3 D). The fluidity of the
ratio system at this time was of great assistance in allowing
the banks to respond to the desires of the business community
to take full advantage of the boom conditions of the time. It
provided the most important means by which the banks re-
sisted deflationary pressure imposed by the Bank and the gov-
ernment in accordance with the general dicta of the Cunliffe
Committee.
The general growth of deposits itself brought one of the
new weapons for enforcing such pressure into play because it
was accompanied by an inevitable increase in the require-
ments for hand to hand currency. The manner in which this
requirement was met by the dual system of note issue resulted
in direct pressure being put upon both the joint stock bank
balances at the Bank of England and the reserve of the Bank-
i:ng Department. The Cunliffe Committee's policy was to
place once more upon the shoulders of the banks the burden
of providing the community with additions to existing mone-
tary stocks, by withdrawing the relief given to the reserves of
both the commercial banks and the Bank of England by the
Currency Note system.° It was put into practical effect before
it was made mandatory by law, and was consistently main-
tained. During a period of steady and rapid increase in total
°Cf.Ch. 5, Building an increased Credit Superstructure on the increased
Credit Base.200 RESTORATION
circulation it was a deflatiOnary policy. Yet the Currency
Note continued to give flexibility to the system and mitigated
the effects of a rigorous application of the theory that fluctu-
ations in the total currency should be reflected in fluctuations
in the Bank of England note issue. Chart 5 A discloses very
CHART 5
Administration of the Dual System of .Note Issue and its Influence upon















clearly that the increasing demand for currency was basically
met by the Bank of England and that the major fluctuations
around the rising trend were taken care of by changes in Cur-
rency Notes not covered by Bank of England Notes as reserve.
In accordance with the principles laid down by the Gun-
life Committee, part of the increase in circulation from
February to April 1919 was provided by an increase in Bank
of England Notes, but the contraction that followed in the
early summer was allowed to take place in Currency Notes.
After the unusually large mid-year adjustments of June 1919,
both the advances and deposits of the joint stock banks rap-
idly expanded. Prices were rising and further additions to the
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in part by Bank of England Notes and in part by Currency
Notes. The increase in Bank of England Notes went in part
into circulation and in part into the Currency Note Reserve.
The transfers to the Currency Note Reserve began in Septem-
ber though it was not until December 15 that the Cunliffe
Committee's policy was officially adopted by Treasury Minute.
Bank of England Notes outstanding grew, after July 1919,
morerapidly than gold at the Bank of England and there was
a correspondingly sharp decline in the reserve of the Banking
Department, (ChartB). The Bank was therefore under
pressure rather to contract its own credit extension than to
relieve the joint stock banks from the pressure upon their
reserves resulting from their having to supply the public with
Bank of England Notes rather than Currency Notes. The
joint stock banks, however, were in need of larger reserves
as their advances and deposits were growing, and they utilized
all available means of getting them. Early in 1919 the prefer-
ential interest rates offered them by the Bank of England for
foreign balances were withdrawn. Special depositsat the
Bank. of England declined rapidly (cf. Ch. 5, note 5). It is
not possible to trace the effect of this operation upon the
joint stock bank reserves but it may be presumed that these
'deposits' reappeared under the heading of balances at the
Bank of England at the expense of some other item included
under 'cash and at the Bank of England,' or 'money at call
and short notice.' The repayment of 'special deposits' prob-
ably offset to some degree the reduction in bankers balances
at th.e Bank occasioned by the increase in outstanding circu-
lation.
In addition, the joint stock banks allowed their portfolio of
treasury bills to run off, partly to replenish their reserves and
partly to make room for increased holdings of commercial
bills (Chart 7). Moreover, they forced the discount market
similarly to allow treasury bills to mature without renewing
them and to borrow at the Bank by cutting down sharply
their 'money at call and short notice.' The failure of the202 RESTORATION
banks and the market to renew treasury bills forced the gov-
ernment also, at times, to borrow from the Bank, as is sug-
gested by a sharp decline in treasury bills and a sharp increase
in 'ways and means advances' during the summer of igig
(Chart 6). At other times, however, owing to the buoyancy
CHART 6
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of the revenue during the prosperity of the restocking boom,
the government was in a position to bring a counter-pressure
to bear on the joint stock banks by using surplus revenue to
pay off Bank of England 'ways and means advances,' and thus
preventing Bank of England funds withdrawn from the mar-
ket in payment of taxes from returning to it by the route of
government expenditures.
A conflict of this sort was a complicating and aggravating
factor in the orderly, administration of the public debt and
interfered with the third objective of general policy distin-
guished above. When the government had to borrow from the
Bank, it found the Bank an unwilling lender. Both Bank and
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in the autumn of 1919beganto raise interest rates. In October
and again in November igig the treasury bill rate was in-
creased and in November Bank rate was raised to 6 per cent
fromwar-time level of 5 per cent.






continuedto play upon the deposits and reserves of the British
banking system, but deflationary forces were proving the
stronger. In December 1919 and January 1920 moderate gold
exports were permitted, but these do not appear to have been
taken from the Bank, for gold in the Issue Departmentwas
not reduced. On the other hand the decline in the reserve of
the Banking Department was accelerated by the rise in the
note circulation, while private deposits other than the deposits
of the clearing banks increased rapidly in February. In order
to 'stave off' a further increase in Bank rate, the joint stock
banks deposited most of their remaining stocks of gold with
the Bank of England. This gave only temporary relief to the




















So4rce-MacnillanReport, pp. 286— 289204 RESTORATION
standingcontinued to increase more rapidly than gold (Chart
5 B) and in March both the reserve and the proportion re-
sumed their decline (Chart 8).
The deposit of gold by the joint stock banks at the Bank




corresponding withdrawal of Bank of England orCurrency
Notes, for the cash of the London clearing banks declined
rapidly in the first quarter of 1920(Chart 9). The operation,
SourceMacniller, Committee, Report, Cn,d 3897. p 284
CHART 9
London Clearing Banks, Cash
on Hand and Balances at the
Bank of England, 1919-1921,
monthly
therefore, built up their balances at the Bank, and at the same
time they continued to reduce their already low portfolio of
treasury bills in the first quarter of 1920(Chart7) .InMarch
the market was forced to seek relief by redeeming notes and
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had to borrow at the Bank owing to inability to place treasury
bills.'0
The government, finding itself forced to borrow at the
Bank, raised the rate on treasury bills from 51/2 to 6½per
cent on April 14,andon April 15 Bank rate was raised to 7
per cent. This marked the end of the post-war restocking
boom in England. A 7 per cent Bank rate was retained in force
for over a year. The circulation continued to expand slowly
and Bank of England reserves to fall. The increase in joint
stock bank 'advances' was, however, checked. Deposits contin-
ued to grow but at a much slower rate. Prices turned down-
•ward. The passage to the normal technique of a high Bank rate
to check inflation by putting pressure on the banking system
had been stormy, and was still incomplete. For example, not
until April 21, 1921, when the tender system for the sale of
treasury bills was reintroduced, did the treasury bill rate cease
to dominate the market, and many of the new relationships be-
tween the government, the joint stock banks, and the Bank of
England, which were so clearly in evidence during 1919and
1920,remainedas permanent modifications in the technique
of credit management in London.
Clearing the Decks for a General Stabilization
Program, 1919—1920
Dispersion of Price Levels, 1919—1920
Therise in prices, which complicated the return to normal
techniques and delayed the decontrol of prices in Great Brit-
ain, was part of a world-wide price inflation. Credit was being
liberally extended in many countries, and both Great Britain
and the United States were lending abroad to finance the
production and export of goods to fill gaps left in civilian
consumption and to place industry upon a peace-time basis.
As controls over prices and production were relaxed the con-
cealed inflation of war-time was everywhere making itself
10Man.yof the details in these paragraphs are taken from Harris, op. cit.,
pp. '91—4.206 RESTORATION
felt. Prices rose very unevenly in different countries, as is in-





(1913 OT 1914 =ioo)
MARCH MAY PERCENTAGE
1919 1920 INCREASE
Sweden (Handelssddning) 354 361 2
United States (B.L.S.) ig6 247 26
United Kingdom (Statist) 217 305 41
France (Statistique 336 550 63
Italy (Bachi) 325 700 115
Germany (S. Reichsamt) 274 1,510 451
SOURCE: Commission of Gold and Silver Inquiry (U. S. Senate, Serial g, 1925),
Vol. I and II.
ment of international price levels during this period finally
and fully disclosed the inappropriateness of the pre-war sys-
tem of foreign exchange rates based upon mint pars.
The Pull of the Dollar over the Exchanges
From March i919 untilthe end of the boom the foreign ex-
changes were in process of making a many-sided and mutual
adjustment to this new situation. In this adjustment the dol-
lar occupied an exceptional position. In 1919 America had a
net export surplus in her merchandise trade with all countries
of $4,016million.In her trade with Europe alone it was
million, and with England alone it was $i,g6g million.
The dollar, consequently, was generally strong, 'especially
against European currencies, and more especially against
sterling. This was due partly to Great Britain's own interna-
tional trading position, but also partly to the pressure ex-
ercised on sterling by the weakness of other exchanges. Ster-
ling continued to be the main channel of remittance from
Europe to America and the foreign assets of many countries
in need of New York exchange were either sterling assets or
assets that could be realized upon in London. For Great Brit-
ain and for European countries in general remittance to NewTHE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 207
York was the dominant foreign exchange problem of the
ti me.
A large part of the American export surplus was financed
by the extension of short term credits. Dollar acceptances in-
creased from $750 million in igi8 to $i billion in 1919and
in i92o. Of this amount perhaps three-fourths was due to in-
creased participation of the United States in financing inter-
national trade.'1 In addition, many American goods were be-
ing sold abroad on open-book account. A very large unfunded
trade balance was accumulating in favor of the United States.
This was, of course, only a temporary postponement of the
problemof remittance to New York which had sooner or
later to be met by other means, such as the shipment of gold,
the use of previously accumulated foreign assets, or the fund-
ing of short term obligations in some way. To the extent that
this wa.s not possible purchases in America had to be reduced
under the compulsion of heavily adverse exchange rates.
THE MEANS OF REMITTANCE
Gold. The main stream of newly produced gold was diverted
from America until September 1919, because of the con-
tinuance of British government control of the South African
supply, and after that date by the reappearance of effective
Indian demand in the London market. South African gold
went to India through London from Septemberi 919 to
February 1920, precisely when sterling was under the greatest
pressure in New York. Special gold shipments to America,
however, in a measure counteracted these preliminary effects
of the reestablishment of an international gold market in
London. In June and October 1919, for example, Great
Britain made special remittances of gold to the United States
through Canada to relieve pressure on the sterling exchange,
and in 1920 gold was shipped from London to pay part of
the AngloLFrench loan.
In June 1919 the embargo on the free export of gold from
"Beckhart, op. Cit., III, 311,314.208 RESTORATION
the United States, in force since September 1917, was lifted.
A gold export movement followed, at first to Spain, South
America, Japan, and China, and somewhat later to India.
This marked the reappearance of gold arbitrage as an instru-
ment for holding part of the world system of exchange rates
together. Pesos, yen, and pesetas were sold in London and the
sterling thus acquired was used to purchase gold in New
York. This gold movement also disclosed the new position of
the United States as a center for international clearance, since
the use of European resources previously accumulated in
New York to make payments to South American and to Far
Eastern suppliers of raw materials was partly responsible for
it.'2
Balances. This use of previously accumulated balances was
indicative of the peculiar instability of the world's foreign
exchanges. European countries were no longer able, as in
1915, to settle their indebtedness to America by selling to
American importers credits obtained by their own exports
to other countries. Instead they were forced to draw upon
their own inadequate supplies of dollar exchange to pay their
own debts in South America and the Far East. Had these
parts of the world been, as formerly, debtor to Europe and
creditor to America the situation would have been eased, but
the opposite was the case.13
These transactions were part of a general international re-
distribution of balances concentrated during the war in New
York and London and of their large scale use in payment for
goods and debts. In contrast to the situation of August 1914,
New York, rather than London, was the major focus of these
movements because the replenishment of dollar, rather than
sterling balances, was the dominant foreign exchange prob-
lem. During 1919 and 1920 many foreign balances were with-
drawn from London and transferred to New York. In ac-
4
12 Reserve Bulletin, March i 920, pp.219—20.
13 David Friday, 'Reconstruction inEurope,'Manchester Guardian, Sec.1,
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cordance with the policy of returning to normal techniques
in the London market no attempt was made to retain them
by continuing to offer special interest inducements. At the
same time in New York there was a shift in the international
control of balances—those of neutral countries being built
up and those of the former Allied Powers being reduced.
Previously accumulated balances in New York, redistributed
in this way, provided a major means of payment for the ex-
ceptional volume of merchandise exports that constituted
American participation in the European restocking boom, as
well as for the payments by Europe in South America and
the Far East. It has been estimated that in December 1918
balances owed by the United States to foreigners were about
$1,217 million against American balances abroad of $337
million. Almost all were withdrawn in 1919, 1920, and 1921.
In addition, other forms of foreign controlled short term
capital in the United States were used to liquidate past debts
and to pay for current imports. J. H. Williams has estimated
that in 1920 the total withdrawal of short term capital from
the United States reached the extraordinary sum of $985
million and in 1921, $435 million.
American Capital Exports. Another major means of pay-
ment fDr American goods was the continued large amount of
American capital exports. R. A. Young has estimated that
during 1919 these totaled $2.8 billion. New United States
government advances were $2.5 billion and private advances
of capital funds were a billion dollars, but repayments on
government account were $243 million, and repayments on
private account plus currency exports were about $Goo mil-
lion. The great era of United States government advances,
however, had come to an end, and in order to pay for mer-
chandise imports, Europe had to liquidate very substantial
holdings of American securities. During 1920, million
of outstanding securities were re-imported into the United
States From those who wished to take advantage of the large
exchange profit involved in such sales or from other European210 RESTORATION
sellers of securities who were obliged to liquidate assets to
meet the depression or who were engaged in a post-war re-
adjustment of their investment portfolios. When direct Amer-
ican investments abroad and the moderate government ad-
vances of 1920 are added to these amounts, the estimate for
total capital exports becomes $1,700 million. In a single year
American capital exports had declined $i,ioo million and
had changed radically in character. In 1921 this process con-
tinued.t4
RESTRICTION OF PURCHASES FROM AMERICA
Previously accumulated foreign balances were wasting assets,
the era of American credits on a grand scale was drawing to a
close, and the basis for large triangular international settle-
ments was absent immediately after the collapse of the re-
stocking boom. It was consequently impossible for American
exports to continue undiminished. By February 1920 a pain-
ful trade adjustment under compulsion of low exchange
rates was already in progress; Its magnitude is indicated both
by the size and the distribution of the excess of American
merchandise exports over imports.
Excess of American Merchandise Exports (millions of dollars)
1919 1920 192!
Europe 4,337 3,239 1,599
Great Britain 1,969 1,318 704
Non-Europe _321* _289* 375
Total 4,016 2,950 1,974
* Excessof imports
The Behavior of the Exchanges
BREAKUP OF THE STERLING-DOLLAR-FRANC FOREIGN EXCHANGE
NUCLEUS
With the freeing of the sterling-dollar exchange from official
control in March i 919, the whole system of rates grouped
about thecentralsterling-dollar-francforeign exchange
nucleus and maintained at such cost through the war came to
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an end. Sterling declined rapidly in New York under the com-
bined pressure of a strongly adverse merchandise balance, a
transfer of balances to New York, an increased supply of
sterling created by short term advances to the continent, and
the use from time to time of sterling as a means of carrying
out gold arbitrage transactions. Moderate shipments of gold,
the temporary retention of certain war-time price and fi-
nancial controls in Great Britain, large withdrawals of short
term capital from America, and American short term credits
and capital exports, even on a large scale, were inadequate
diefenses against these sources of weakness. The decline of
sterling was part of a general decline against the dollar which
exercised an extraordinary pull over the world's exchanges.
To this general decline, however, there were two notable
exceptions: a small group of currencies that clung to their
pre-war relationships to the dollar and the silver currencies,
India and China.
It is proper to refer to India as a silver country at this time
because the price of silver was rising sufficiently to influence
directly the value of the rupee and to present to the Indian
government the problems of managing a genuine silver cur-
rency rather than a gold or sterling exchange standard. In
May 1919war-timecontrols over the silver market in London
were abandoned. A strong demand for silver from China, com-
bined with the decline of the sterling-dollar exchange, drove
UI) the price of silver in the London market, and in order to
protectrupee from going into the melting pot the sterling-
rupee rate was rapidly raised. From i8 d. in May 1918 it rose
to 32 d. in February 1920, when the abortive attempt at
stabilization in terms of dollars was made.'5 As the dollar-
rupee rate is essentially a cross-rate, the rupee rose in New
York to the extent that its rise in London was greater than
the decline of sterling in New York. The Shanghai tael also
rose in New York with the rise in the price of silver.
Cf. Brown,op. cit., p. especiallychart showing the sterling-rupee ex-
change rate and the bullion value of the rupee.212 RESTORATION
TABLEII
ExchangeRates of India and China on New York
November 1918—December1920(dollars)
RUPEE SHANGHAI TAEL
1918 1919 1920 1918 1919 1920
January .357 .440 1.234 1.612
February .357 .476 r.i86
March .358 .478 1.122 1.487
April .355 .468 '.383
May .383 .433 1.231 i.ig8
June .42! .410 1.248 r.o6o
July .416 .383 1.235 1.035
August .417 .364 1.302 1.120
September .439 .336 1.321 z.o68
October .436 .305 1.386 .987
November .433 .297 1.235 1.539 .913
December .358 .455 .269 1.243 i.6i8 .788
souRcE: Commission of Gold and Silver Inquiry (U.S. Senate, Serial 8, 1924), pp.
4-55
TABLE 12
Exchange Rates on New York, February and December 1919,Monthly




Argentina 105.67 101.90 —3.77
Japan 103.39 101.14 —2.25
Spain 105.67 101.09 —4.58
Brazil 80.04 88.64 8.6o'
Switzerland 106.22 95.60 —'0.62
Holland 102.87 94.16
Canada 92.81
England 97.9! 78.34 —'9.57
Sweden 105.29 8o.6o —24.69
Norway 102.24 76.87 —25.37
Denmark 97.51 70.09 —27.42
Belgium 49.95
France 47.89 —47.19
Italy 81.61 39.70 —41.91
SOURCE: Commission of Gold andSilverInquiry (U.S. Senate, Serial 8, 1924), pp. 10,
II,30, 3!
1 Percentage increase.THE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 213
With the rapid decline in silver prices, which began in
February 1920 and converted the Far Eastern countries from
buyer:; into sellers of gold, both the rupee and the tad began
to decline in New York. The movement in these two silver
exchanges during 1919 and 1920 is shown in Table ii.
By December 1919 the break-up of the war-time sterling-
'FABLE 13
Exchange Rates on New rork, February 1920
Averagesof Daily Quotations as Percentages of Pre- War Pars
Argentina England 69
japan 98 Sweden 69
Norway 64
Holland 92
Spain 90 Denmark 55
Canada 86




Commission of Gold and Sliver Inquiry (U.S. Senate, Serial 8, 1924), p. 34
TABLE 14
Exchange Depreciation in New rork
Five Alajor Gounlries, 1919-1921
PERCENTAGE
DECLINE BEGAN DECLINE ENDED DECLINE
Canada Nov.1919 Feb.1920 9
Spain Dec.1919 Nov.1920 34
Argentina April 1920 Nov.1920 22
Netherlands April 1920 Nov.1920 17
Brazil May 1920 June1921 47
dollar-franc nucleus of exchange rates had proceeded far
enough to indicate a threefold grouping of the currencies,
other than the rupee, that had clustered about it during the
war: those clinging to the dollar, those following sterling, and
those following the franc (Table 12). The small group of
countries that had resisted the influence of the decline of
sterling immediately after March 1919 or had succeeded after
the first few months in checking the decline in their exchanges214 RESTORATION.
in New York, was, however, already beginning to break up.
This is apparent from the distribution of rates about the old
pars in February 1920, when the sterling-dollar rate reached
its lowest point (Table iThemonths in which the ex-
changes of some of these countries began to fall in New York,
and the extent of the declines are shown in Table 14. Switzer-
land might have been included in this table on the ground
that the Swiss franc during the latter half ofi9i9 did not
follow the decline of sterling in New York, but this country
was not really a member of the dollar group, for thereafter
fluctuations in the sterling-dollar exchange were faithfully
reflected in the Swiss franc-dollar rate.
FORMATION OF GROUPS IN THE EXCHANGES
As early as February 1920 the currencies of Belgium, Den-
mark, Norway, Italy, France, Sweden, and Switzerland were,
in their general mode of fluctuation in New York, moving
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from the group of countries clinging to the dollar was already
marked, and the decline of their exchanges in New York con-
tinued during the recovery of the pound sterling which began
in February 1920 and in which the sterling countries named
shared. When, in the summer of 1920, sterling again turned
downward it was followed not only by the original sterling
group but also by those currencies whose stable relationship
to the dollar had been broken. During the latter part of 1919
and1920 the Reichsmark also, though it had lost approxi-
mately 90 per cent of its exchange value, followed in its fluctu-
ations in New York the general course of the sterling-dollar
rate. A still larger group of countries moving in a common
pattern against the dollar and dominated in their movements
by the sterling-dollar rate was thus formed. The partial dis-
integration of the dollar group and the common movement
of the sterling and franc groups are shown in Chart io and
the supporting figures are given in Table 15.
DISPERSION OF RATES, NOVEMBER 1920
The dispersion of exchange rates from the old parities with
the dollar which existed in November 1920 was greater than
TABLE
Exchange Rates on New York, November 1920
Averages of Daily Quotations as Percentages of Pre- War Pars
Japan 102 Brazil 51
Denmark 50
Canada 8g Norway 50
Switzerland 8° Belgium 33




England 71 Germany 5
Spain 67
SOURCE: Commission of Gold and SilveT Inquiry (U.S. Senate, Serial 8, 1924), p. 52-3
ever (Table i6). Nevertheless, there was no chaos in the
foreign exchanges. They were seeking new levels appropriate
to changes in the purchasing power of the various currenciesTHE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 217
and to new international trade and financial relationships
that had been growing up ever since the outbreak of the war,
andeven before. They were grouping themselves about their
natural leaders. The decks were being cleared for a fresh and,
more general formulation of the whole for-
eign exchange problem.
Contrasts Established between Legal and Economic
Conceptions of the Role of Gold
Gold as Reserve
The general terms of this new formulation of the foreign ex-
change problem were set by the rapid and unequal rise of
prices in former gold standard countries. The role of gold re-
serves in the banking systems of these countries during this
period presents several interesting contrasts. In many coun-
tries i.nadequacy of gold reserves played no role in checking
credit. expansion. In England, however, which was not 'on'
the international gold standard, the gold reserve of the Bank
of England and the behavior of its proportion were, in the
ways described above, important factors in the application of
policies designed to check credit inflation. The amount of the
gold reserve was expressed in terms of the pre-war gold
sovereign and the proportion, consequently, was not in-
fluenced in any way by sterling depreciation in• gold. In the
technical administration of credit control policies in England
the measure of sterling depreciation established in the bullion
market played no role. In the formulation of that policy it
played a great role. The British banking system was operated
upon. the assumption that the pound sterling would in due
course once again command abroad the same amount of gold
that it had commanded before the war and that it continued
to command at home. In formulating its policies the Bank of
England had regard for "the safety of its establishment" by
using the old measures, and for "the state of the exchanges"
by using the new. Though off the gold standard it took the
economic steps required of a country 'on' the gold standard.218 RESTORATION
It retained a conception of 'normal' reserve ratios based not
upon the exceptional circumstances of the moment but on
the traditional practices of the past and the long run hopes
of the future.
In the United States maintenance of the concept of 'normal'
reserve ratios was having quite different effects. By the re-
moval of the restrictions on the export of gold America had,
in June 1919,resumedall the formal attributes of a country
adhering to the international gold standard. An export of
gold followed. Yet that loss of gold did not lead to any credit
restriction in the United States. On the contrary, it was ac-
companied by an ever expanding growth in the superstructure
of bank credit. This is in rather marked contrast to pre-war
gold standard tradition. It is true that in its management of
the gold standard before the war the Bank of England some-
times permitted gold to be drawn from its reserves without
taking steps to restrict credit. This happened, however, only
when the Court believed that the gold would return to it in
due course, as in the case of regular seasonal movements. The
gold export from the United States after June 1919 was not
of this character, and on pre-war gold standard principles
action should have been taken to check it. It was a purely
fortuitous circumstance that the American banking system
held sufficient excess gold reserves after the war to meet this
demand. Until December igig, after the successful flotation
of the Victory Loan, the structure of interest rates in the New
York market was dominated by the will of the Treasury. It
was impossible for the Federal Reserve banks to adopt a credit
control policy by the use of the discount rate. Though deeply
concerned over the course of the inflation, the authorities of
the system were not under the compulsion to take action
imposed by a depletion of gold reserves 'in a gold standard
country committed to a rigid conception of 'normal' reserve
ratios. The gold exports did not, until the middle of 1920,
cause the reserve ratio of the Federal Reserve banks to ap-
proach the legal minimum.THE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 219
The financing of the post-war boom, therefore, met with no
(:heCk from gold reserves in the United States, because gold
reserves were regarded from a formal and legal rather than
from a general economic point of view. The tradition of
4normal' was indeed carefully preserved, and the depletion
of goid reserves exercised an important economic pressure
upon t.he American credit system at the culmination of the
1920 boom. But both before and after, the legally defined
gold reserve ratios of the Federal Reserve banks were not a
continuing factor in the guidance of American credit policy.
They did not contribute greatly to the establishment of stable
credit conditions. They were, for the most part, an abstract
legal concept which intermittently exercised a psychological
influence on credit control policy, and on rare, but notable
occasions, determined the course of action in time of crisis.
The idea of normal reserve ratios in many other countries
was intimately bound up with a conflict between legal and
economic conceptions of the role of gold as the monetary
standard. It was this conflict that introduced hidden reserves
into the accounting of central banks and deprived their pub-
lished reserve ratios of definite meaning except as statements
the ;ituation that would have prevailed had pre-war ex-
change rates on New York been maintained and as promises
to see that such rates would be restored in the future.
Gold a.s Standard
Not only England, but all former gold standard countries
used the New York exchange as a measure of the depreciation
of their currencies in terms of gold. They continued, how-
ever, to preserve in their domestic accounting treatment of
the metal the concept that there had been no such depreci-
ation.
The arrangements by which the export of South African
gold from England was permitted in September 1919 are of
particular interest from this point of view. Under these ar-
rarigements N. M. Rothschild and Son, who had long been220 RESTORATION
agents for the sale of a portion of the South African gold pro-
duction in London, were appointed the London agents for all
the South African gold mines. Contracts were entered into
between them and the Transvaal Chamber of Mines and the
Bank of England under the terms of which the members of
the Transvaal Chamber Of Mines were to ship gold to the
Bank of England, which undertook to see that licenses for
the export of that gold were issued within five weeks after its
receipt. During the war gold shipped to the Bank of England
had been purchased by the Bank at 77 s. 9 d. per standard
ounce. Under the new contracts the Bank delivered the gold
to refiners acting for the producers, though still maintaining
the price at 77 s. 9 d. After the gold had been refined, the re-
finers sold it at the same price to N. M. Rothschild and Son
who immediately resold it to the highest bidder. The gold
was offered to the trade and to the bullion brokers in London
who ivere given an opportunity to bid for it on the basis of a
'net parity price' with New York, arrived at by dividing the
price of gold in New York by the rate of the sterling-dollar
exchange and deducting freight, insurance, and other ex-
penses. Whatever gold was not taken by the bullion market
at above the New York parity price was shipped by N. M.
Rothschild and Son to the United States after they had sold
dollars against it. It is to be noted particularly that the price
at which N. M. Rothschild and Son purchased the gold from
the Bank of England was the statutory price, and that the
difference between it and the open market price, which con-
stituted the 'premium' on gold in London, was later paid by
a tn-monthly settlement. The Bank of England by these ar-
rangements kept detailed control over the actual passage of
the gold in and out of England,18 and even while acting as an
intermediary for others did not alter its statutory buying
price for gold.
16Becausethe license to export covered South African gold alone, small ship-
ments coming from other parts of the world to the London market for sale
had to be disposed of either to the trade or to the Bank of England at prices
far below the open market price for South African gold.THE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 221
By these means a sharp distinction was drawn between gold
in England and gold in England plus a license to extort. This
distinction maintained the legal fiction that the gold standard
was still in force in England, and the popular belief that that
legal fiction had substance and economic significance. It made
it possible for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stanley Bald-
win, in introducing the Gold and Silver (Export Control)
Act in Parliament, to speak in the following terms:
"The great danger of which those who are responsible for the
guarding of the gold in this country are apprehensive is this: If
at any time in this country any accumulation of gold is allowed
to grow up of which they have not complete control it always in-
creases the danger of smuggling gold, and makes the work of the
melter of gold coinage much easier. The really effective protec-
don against the melting of gold coin today is the impossibility
of getting gold out of the country. If there were any such relaxa-
tion as would make it more easy, by smuggling, for the melter of
gold coins to get the melted gold out of the country there would
be the risk of a drain of gold. If that took place to any extent
we should run the risk of having to suspend gold payments and
frill back on unconvertible paper money, which, of course, would
lead to the greatest panic in this country that ever was seen."
Theconflict between the economic and juridical view of
gold as the monetary standard, which prevailed in many
c:ountries after the war, clearly could not continue indefi-
rritely. The new distribution of the exchanges around the
pre-war parities, which began to be defined in 1920, made it
necessary to face the problem of bringing the two conceptions
again into harmony. For this reason it was imperative to
formulate a general foreign exchange policy which should be
a policy of ends as well as of means.
General Formulation of the Post-War Exchange
Stabilization Problem
The British decision to return to the old parity with the
dollar 'was taken on the day when sterling first deviated from
"136H.C. Deb. 5s., p."6(our italics).222 RESTORATION
it? Because of the magnitude of the deviation from the old
parities of many exchanges during their general decline in
terms of the dollar, it was obvious that an attitude like that
of the Cunliffe Committee could not be maintained in all
countries. The economic costs of returning to the pre-war
rates of exchange, through the application of principles such
as those embodied in the Cunliffe Report, would be prohibi-
tive for such countries as Russia, Austria, and Germany. The
appropriate policy for France and Italy was at least debatable,
though in both countries the expectation of a return to 'nor-
mal' in this respect was very slow in dying.'°
It had become clear during the early stages of the restock-
ing boom that some general statement of the nature of the
foreign exchange problem, which would be authoritative and
would represent a broad general consensus of opinion, was
highly desirable. Such a formulation was accomplished at the
Brussels Conference of 1920. A distinction was there made
between the policy appropriate to countries whose exchanges
were depreciated little and to those whose exchanges had
depreciated much. In his memorandum to the Conference,
Professor Pigou set forth the alternatives in the following
terms:
"The decision by any country so to control its currency as to es-
tablish a parity, or rather centre of parity, between that currency
and gold leaves open a fundamentally important issue. What
parity shall be established: shall it be the pre-war parity, or the
parity that is found to exist when the process of 'inflation' is
brought to an end, or some parity intermediate between the two?
The principal relevant conditions are as follows. In favour of a
return to pre-war parity it may be urged that the adoption of
any lower parity means deliberate government depreciation of
18Thiswas the answer given to the writer by the highest money market au-
thorities in London in reply to the question, 'When did England decide to re-
turn to gold at the old par?'
to Emile Moreau, Governor of the Bank of France, M. Poincaré
was, even in 1928, "at the bottom of his heart," a believer in a return to par;
'Le Rèlevement Financier et Monétairc de Ia France, 1926—28,' Revue des Deux
Mondes, April 15,1937, p.826 and pp. 825—46, passim.THE STABILIZATION PROBLEM 223
the currency, and so lowers general confidence in the financial
probity of the country in which it is done: and that it is unfair
to all lenders at fixed interest, whose loans were made before the
war o:r during its earlier stages before the currency had greatly
depreciated. On the other side it may be urged that in countries
where the currency is greatly depreciated, a return to pre-war
parity would involve an enormous contraction of currency and
fall of prices, that this could only be brought about by a long
continued regime of high money rates and consequent check
upon industry; that it would necessitate a more or less corre-
sponding reduction of money wages only attainable through seri-
:ous friction and many stoppages of work. Moreover, it would in-
volve the payment of interest on war loans in a currency much
more valuable than that in which a large part of them were sub-
scribed. Yet again, money incomes being reduced in proportion
as currency was appreciated, it would make necessary much
higher rates of tax to provide interest and sinking fund on the
debt, and this would make more difficult the fiscal problem of
balancing the budget.
In the light of these considerations it is clear that the case for a
return to the pre-war parity is stronger—that is to say, the argu-
ments in favour of it have more, and those against it have less
force—-the nearer to this parity a country's currency is found to
be when 'inflation' is finally stayed." 20
Oncethe idea that new rates of exchange must be chosen
by ma:riy countries was accepted, the question of the basis of
such a choice became all important. It was the great service
of Professor Cassel that, at this juncture when the course of
the exchanges presented in outward semblance a picture of
chaos, he provided a clarifying principle of action in the
form of his restatement of the purchasing power parity doc-
trine. En the light of this generalization, and with the informa-
2)A.C. Pigou, Memorandum on Credit, Currency, and Exchange Fluctuations
(submitted to the Brussels Conference), 1920,p.ii.ProfessorPigou's entire
memorandum proceeds upon the assumption that under the conditions exist-
ing Ifl 1920goldwas essentially more stable than sterling. This assumption
was a natural one but the history of the fourteen subsequent years necessitates
its reexamination. Cf. Ch.224 RESTORATION
tion made available through such calculations as those which
first made their appearance in the Memoranda on Currency
of the Financial Section of the League of Nations, an intel-
ligible general picture was obtained of the approximation of
actual exchange rates to some point where stabilization might
be successfully effected.